James Treadway
Increasing domestic pressure from opponents of the Vietnam War and the fact that the war was not going well militarily prompted a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in Vietnam soon after Biddle’s first Gulf deployment in 1968. When Biddle returned for her second deployment in 1969, negotiations with North Vietnam were underway in Paris, a prohibition against bombing targets in North Vietnam had been in effect since November 1968, and Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt’s operation Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy (SEALORDS) was putting heavy pressure on Communist forces in the Mekong Delta. By 1970, as the U.S. withdrawal continued, the Vietnamese Navy had assumed many SEALORDS operational responsibilities, while U.S. Navy blue-water combatants in the Tonkin Gulf carried the war to the enemy in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, instead of the heart of North Vietnam. Furthermore, the number of attack carriers at Yankee Station had been reduced from three to two and rigorous cost cutting measures limited fuel, aircraft and ammunition. By 1971, the number of ships dedicated to the Naval Gunfire Support Unit was limited and the battleship New Jersey (BB-62), with many other large caliber gun ships, had returned to the United States.
The steady decline of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam reversed in the spring of 1972 when North Vietnam launched their 1972 Easter Offensive. The attack, which broke through the DMZ into the Central Highlands toward Saigon, was countered by increased amphibious activity in I Corps in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam as well as naval gunfire support in I Corps and the southern provinces of North Vietnam. Within weeks after the Communist offensive began, the interdiction that had been in place since November of 1968 was lifted and the war was being carried to North Vietnam from Saigon to the border of China. Many seaports in North Vietnam, including Haiphong, were mined in an attempt to prevent the importation of military equipment. To support the massive effort, the Task Force 77 attack carrier population grew to an all time high of six carriers.
The North Vietnamese countered the U.S. offensive in several areas. U.S. aerial supremacy over North Vietnam was successfully challenged by a massive employment of anti-aircraft weapons, which included both guns and missiles. Their successes were not matched in air-to-air combat, however. The ever-increasing population of Naval Fighter Weapons School (Topgun) graduates in the fleet had reversed an earlier embarrassing exchange rate. The final USN – USMC fighter versus fighter exchange rate of 5.6 to 1 (Nichols 168) was due in large part to Navy pilots such as Lieutenant Randy Cunningham, the Navy’s only Vietnam War ace. North Vietnamese coastal batteries offered some resistance to Naval Gunfire Support activities, but were generally ineffective.
In early April, as Biddle was preparing for a cruise to the Mediterranean in June, Sterett (DLG-31) was involved in an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that became known as the “Battle Off Dong Hoi.” Ten weeks after the Battle Off Dong Hoi, Biddle would be engaged in a similar battle for her life – the “Battle at PIRAZ.” The similarities between Biddle’s battle and Sterett’s struggle as well as the close relationship between the sister ships require that both stories be told.
Sterett Sets the Standard
DS2 Elden Miller, who was aboard Sterett in 1972, described in detail the events of the Battle Off Dong Hoi on Sterett’s web site. Additionally, Elden and I exchanged many e-mails regarding Sterett’s and Biddle’s MiG engagements when we were writing a book about the events entitled MiGs, Missiles, and MTBs. The book was not completed but helped launch Hard Charger! The following paragraphs summarize the Battle Off Dong Hoi.
Sterett was operating in the northern gulf in April 1972 when she received orders to provide anti-air support for a gun-line mission near Dong Hoi with light cruiser Oklahoma City (CLG-5), and the destroyers Higbee (DD-806) and Lloyd Thomas (DD-764).
After a rendezvous north of Dong Hoi on 19 April, the strike group made their first gun run from north to south with Oklahoma City in the lead, the destroyers following, and Sterett separated from the group to provide AAW support. According to Elden, “The weather that day was clear but with reduced visibility of less than two miles and was described as ‘hazy at best.’” Sterett had launched her Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) helicopter, which was to act as an airborne spotter. Sterett had already received permission from 7th Fleet to use missiles if required.
On the first run, all three ships received fire from shore batteries in an apparent attempt to bracket the ships. There were no direct hits but Oklahoma City reported shrapnel damage from near hits. Sterett had detected air targets below hilltops on the run to the south and was ready if a MiG wanted to see some action. Sure enough, a single MiG 17 suddenly went “feet wet” in the direction of the group just as the group finished their run to the north.
Elden recounts that, “The MiG headed for the Higbee, passed over the ship amidships and dropped a 250-pound bomb. The bomb tumbled towards Higbee, and passed between the aft stack and the ASROC launcher, barely missing the railings and ended up in the water. It was a very near miss with no damage. This was the first time in Navy history that a MiG aircraft had ever attacked a U.S. Navy ship.”
Even though the MiG was inside Sterett’s minimum missile range, Sterett attempted to fire a full salvo of missiles at the target. Only one bird left the rail, however, which narrowly missed. The second bird failed to fly due to a faulty primary firing circuit. The MiG circled for another pass and dropped a second 250-pound bomb that hit Higbee’s fantail near the 5-inch mount. The bomb penetrated the weather deck into the upper ammunition handing room – the resulting explosion destroyed the mount, the sprinkler system, after steering, and ruptured the aft fuel tanks. Now dead in the water and flames engulfing the entire aft section of Higbee, the situation had turned from serious to grave.
The MiG, now 9,500 yards from Sterett and at an altitude of 300 feet, banked to the west and headed for the mountains. Sterett’s fire control radar had locked on the target and the missile that had not fired earlier was fired using a secondary firing circuit. Still inside minimum missile range, the missile did not have enough range for the booster to separate. Elden describes the destruction of the MiG, “The missile struck the MiG dead center where the wings join the fuselage, resulting in instant destruction of the aircraft. This strike was more of a mid-air collision, but highly effective, nonetheless. The extreme accuracy of the launch systems and target designation hardware enabled this pure ballistic shot.”
A second MiG had entered the fray but didn’t stay long. Apparently, after observing the destruction of his comrade, MiG number two sought safety in the mountains. Sterett’s fire control radars had locked on the fleeing MiG and a second salvo was on its way. Just after the MiG went “feet dry,” all telemetry signals indicated that the MiG was destroyed and the target disappeared from radar. Unfortunately, the incident was eventually labeled a “probable” kill in spite of the fact that one of two Air Force F-4s, who were not officially supposed to be in the area, observed the MiG go down.
In addition to the MiG activity, Sterett had been tracking suspicious surface craft in the Dong Hoi area. The North Vietnamese did have Motorized Torpedo Boats (MTBs) but the Tonkin Gulf also tended to generate false echoes. One hostile surface track that was being tracked in Continuous Boat Track (CBT) mode provided vertical video separation, which indicated missile launch and an Anti Ship Cruise Missile (ACM) ECM signature. The incoming target was identified as a SS-N-2 Styx missile which has an active homing system and a 2,000 pound warhead. Sterett’s aluminum superstructure and lightly armored hull would provide little protection. Furthermore, Sterett’s Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) system with rocket decoys and radar reflective chaff was not operable.
Elden summarizes the critical situation: “A hit by the Styx would most assuredly be fatal to Sterett. This was the first time a Navy ship had ever been attacked by a cruise type guided missile in a combat situation. The early positive lock by the SPG-55 fire control radar allowed Sterett to immediately fire a salvo of two Terriers following the Styx launch. If Sterett would have had to acquire the Styx normally with her air search radars, plot the course via several paints (radar sweeps), and then hand it over to the missile fire control radars, she could never have fired missiles in time to intercept the Styx missile. Bridge lookouts reported seeing Sterett’s Terriers enter a cloudbank and explode. The Styx was never visually spotted. Following the detonation of our Terrier, the missile target disappeared from radar, and the ECM signature signal ceased.”
Battle Off Dong Hoi – The North Vietnamese Version
Stories have two sides and the Battle Off Dong Hoi is no exception. In MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War, Istvan Toperczer described the battle as told by the North Vietnamese pilots who allegedly flew the mission, Le Xuan Di and Nguyen Van Bay of the 923rd Fighter Regiment. MiG pilots Di and Bay were among ten pilots from the 923rd who had been preparing for an attack on shipping since 1971. Six pilots were eventually selected for the assignment.
On the day of the attack, Di and Bay took off from a secret air base at Gat and flew north toward Ly Hoa. Upon receiving orders to attack, the two pilots headed directly for the puffs of smoke in the Gulf. According to Nguyen Van Bay, “Over the sea Le Xuan Di turned to the left towards USS Higbee (DD-806) (sic) and increased his speed to 800 km/h while aiming at the ship. At a distance of 750 m he released his bombs and broke to the left. Both the 250-kg bombs hit the ship. He reported this to ground control, and at 1618 hrs he landed at Gat airfield. His speed was too great, however, and Li Xuan Di overran the landing strip and ended up in the arrester barrier, but fortunately neither he nor his jet was damaged (Toperczer 53, 54).”
Friendly Fire Incident Brings Biddle Back
Three days before Sterett’s engagement with the MiG, USS Worden (DLG-18) was severely damaged while on North SAR. One man was killed and nine wounded by what was thought to be two errant anti-radiation missiles fired by friendly forces. This tragic incident set in motion a chain of events that brought Biddle back to the Gulf of Tonkin a third time to make up for the loss of the damaged ship. In a short period of time, Sterett had relieved Worden and Biddle’s Med cruise was cancelled. Biddle made preparations for an immediate Tonkin Gulf deployment.
Biddle’s CIC and NTDS Officer, Lieutenant Ralph Muse, recalled that,
Biddle had just completed six months of technical and operational testing of the Shortstop Electronic warfare system. The EW and NTDS systems on board were configured for use on carriers. The system was successful in handling up to 22 simulated missile attacks at the same time in tests (the simulation was done using special radar and electronics on F8s and F4s to simulate Soviet missiles.) The ship was scheduled for a Mediterranean deployment in June 1972. After six months of Monday through Saturday sailing we were looking forward to the deployment. On Saturday 8 April 1972 we were notified that we would be sailing to an undisclosed location WESTPAC on the morning of 12 April. (So much for our Mediterranean cruise.)
The ship was hardly ready – spare parts were in short supply and we were undermanned. We had only twelve radar men on board when a complement of 30 to 50 was normal. The manning level in Engineering Dept. was even worse. On Monday April 11th the CIC Officer (CICO) was reassigned and I was appointed CICO as well as NTDS officer. The only good news was that we could requisition any parts or supplies we needed from any ship in port (thanks, USS Josephus Daniels).
Biddle was ordered made ready for immediate deployment to the Gulf of Tonkin on 8 April. She departed Norfolk for the Western Pacific on 12 April with Mullinnix (DD-944) and was joined by Glennon (DD-840), and Sarsfield (DD-839) on 14 April. Enroute to the Gulf, the DS gang discovered that the reliability of the three CP-642B NTDS computers increased considerably with uninterrupted ship’s power applied to them, instead of switching to shore power when in port. As a result of this discovery, failures were drastically reduced by the time Biddle reached the Gulf. Also, Lieutenant Muse noted that after picking up additional personnel in Panama, Hawaii, Guam, and Subic Bay, Biddle arrived on station with thirty-five radar men, a complete Security Group, and a helo detachment.
Biddle Arrives in Gulf of Tonkin
When Biddle relieved Sterett at NSAR on 16 May 1972, it is unlikely that Biddle’s crew knew about Sterett’s battle off Dong Hoi the month before. At that time, the Navy did not advertise that a ship had splashed a MiG even though it was a great source of pride and accomplishment for the ship’s crew. It is likely, however, that news of the MiG splash had been disseminated to the upper ranks and to the commanding officers of ships entering the Gulf of Tonkin Theater.
There was nothing to indicate that Biddle and Sterett would accomplish a remarkable feat – back to back MiG kills, with each ship claiming one confirmed kill and one probable kill. So, with two previous Gulf deployments and recent weapons, NTDS and ECM upgrade under her belt, Biddle entered the Gulf prepared for any action that might come her way. This would be her final deployment to the Tonkin Gulf and one that her crew would not forget.
The recently expanded war effort presented a different picture than Biddle’s previous GOT deployments. SSAR, NSAR and PIRAZ stations were still there and Biddle’s responsibilities at those stations would change little. MiG activity would prove to be a different matter, however. A veteran of Biddle’s 1969 WESTPAC deployment, OS1 Jerry Kronvall, got a quick introduction to the dynamic war scene. He explains:
I was the ship’s NTDS Air Controller Supervisor when Biddle assumed duties as North SAR in the Gulf of Tonkin on 18 May 1972. Sitting at the NTDS console as the main Air Controller, I took control of a section of Navy F-4J fighters that were on station between Haiphong, North Vietnam and us. I thought that this would be same type of aircraft control that happened in our 1969 deployment – long control times but no action.
The F-4s were from VF-161, call sign ROCKRIVERS 110 and 105. On the radarscope were two aircraft that were bearing down on the ROCKRIVERS. I didn’t have any friendly IFF or any reports of MiGs in the area so I told the ROCKRIVERS the range and bearing of the strangers (unidentified aircraft) and kept reporting the position of the strangers. I turned the F-4s toward the strangers so they could ID the two planes. The section leader of ROCKRIVER came over the radio saying “BANDITS, BANDITS, BANDITS” – they had identified the strangers as two MiG-19s. Captain Carter was standing behind me so I asked permission to engage and arm the F-4’s missiles. Captain Carter gave the order “ENGAGE the MiGs.” I told the ROCKRIVERS to engage the MiGs and they were cleared to fire their missiles. The ROCKRIVERS engaged the MiGs and released two Sidewinders. Both MiGs were destroyed. This happened in the first two hours on the first day on the line.
On 23 May the ROCKRIVERS were back – ROCKRIVERS 100 and 112. Two MiG 17s were coming and they were over Kep, North Vietnam. Captain Carter was once again in CIC and once again I asked to engaged the MiGs and received “WEAPONS FREE” from Captain Carter. Both ROCKRIVERS engaged and shot two Sidewinders. Both MiGs were destroyed.
My memory of one engagement is not logged in the Air Controller’s log that I kept but it did make the newspapers back in the US. I engaged one MiG, but before the F-4 released his missile, the pilot of the MiG bailed out. Captain Carter argued with the Admiral on the carrier that I should be given credit for downing the MiG. The pilot of the F-4 came up and apologized for not releasing a missile. I still think that I should have been given credit for downing the MiG. If that happened, I would have been an ace on the first line period.
On 7 June I intercepted a MiG using VF-213 at nighttime. The pilots from VF-213 were heloed to Biddle and presented the following story to Captain Carter and myself along with other RDs. We were having problems when an aircraft was hit by a missile or “AAA” fire and the aircraft was damaged, the MiG’s would come up and shoot our aircraft out of the sky. VF-213 wanted to come up acting as an A-7 that was wounded. So, we made the F-4 look and act like an A-7. Even the voice comms were the exact duplicate of an A-7. Sure enough, the MiG came up and we engaged the F-4. The Aircraft Combat Maneuvers (ACM) lasted 20 minutes or a little longer. We didn’t shoot the MiG down but the MiG’s stopped engaging our wounded aircraft for quite a while. This engagement was the most stressful engagement that I did.
On 8 June I engaged a MiG-21 50 miles due east of Phucten, North Vietnam. The F-4s were from VF-214 and their callsign was LINFIELD 211 and 212. The F-4s were fighting for about 15 minutes but kept losing missile lock tones. The engagement was broken off and everyone went home alive.
On 10 June I engaged MiG’s with VF-214, on 11 June (my birthday) with VF-151, on 12 June with VF-31 and again on 13 June with VF-123. No kills took place but the engagements were from 10 to 30 minutes long as I recall.
When the action was slow and nothing was going on and CIC was doing the normal things you do in a combat zone. Captain Carter actually directed the action from CIC. This was the first time that I ever saw a Captain do that.
This was not the first time that Biddle’s commanding officer “directed the action from CIC.” Captain Scott set the precedent aboard Biddle. In an e-mail, Captain Scott stated “I did ALL, repeat, ALL actions and considered CIC my 24 hour a day place to be during any evolution. The bridge was the location for the JO of the deck and I went there only to look at the ocean to relax. As you know, we ran the ship from CIC with total control from there with watch officer there in total control and I had a seat over looking all of CIC. By no means were they the first and maybe even we were not. Check it out with Bob Gerity or Bob Baker or Wes Boer. It was basic doctrine.”
Captain Scott is correct that Biddle was not the first to control a ship from CIC – perhaps the precedent was set aboard the test service ships Oriskany, Mahan, and King in the early 60’s. Captain Garett Lockee, Wainwright’s commanding officer from September 1966 to April 1968, reported in the April 1969 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that “The ship’s commanding officer spends most of his time in this space [CIC], rather than on the bridge. The ship fights from CIC, not from the bridge, as has been the custom of the past.”
I asked Captain Scott if it was it official policy or regulation, personal choice, or a blend of the two to run the ship from CIC. He responded that “It was NOT official policy or regulation. Where I ran the ship was my call. I could have run it from after steering below decks if I so desired. CIC was the location for what were doing. However, if we had been in a different type of operation,maybe it would have been on the bridge part or all of the time and the e with CIC. Even from my cabin or the head.” (Who said the skipper doesn’t have a sense of humor.)
Kronvall continues:
The Captain and I usually talked about what we were going to do the next day. During our talks I mentioned that MiGs were coming up and flying to a certain location and then disappearing and then reappearing on the radarscope. This was in the first part of June when the MiGs were being observed by the RDs. This was constant during the month of June and the first part of July. Captain Carter and I along with the rest of the Air Tracking Team and the other Air Controllers also watched this action during their watches. Looking back, they were honing their skills for what was to come.
On 18 June we engaged five MiGs with two F-4s from VF-123. I had a very difficult time (keeping track) of who was who during this engagement. All sidewinders from both F-4s and all sparrows were shot (eight Sidewinders, eight Sparrows). The F-4s were also receiving missiles from the MiGs. The F-4s reported two unconfirmed kills (the F-4s were avoiding missiles and did not take pictures of the kills). Only three MiG’s were present when the engagement was over.
On 11 July, using F-4s from VF-123 call sign CLUBLEAF 211 and 212, we engaged three or four MiGs. During the engagement CLUBLEAF 212 was shot down. One MiG lost control during the engagement and flew into the ground. The MiG kill was considered an unconfirmed kill. This was a good day and a bad day for me. Footnote: Both the pilot and RIO was taken prisoner and released in 1973.
On 18 July SNUG 1 from the Air Force 336th Tactical Fighter Squadron shot down a MiG-21. RD1 Nastasi was the Air Controller and I observed the engagement as an Air Controller Supervisor.
OS1 Kronvall’s accounts are illuminating but some claims do not appear to be correct. For instance, the MiG engagements on 18 May, 23 May, and 7 June mention Captain Carter’s presence in CIC. Captain Carter did not assume command of Biddle until 3 July. Also, he could not have been aboard during ”the month of June and the first part of July” when “Captain Carter and I along with the rest of the Air Tracking Team and other Air Controllers also watch (sic) this action during their watches.” Furthermore, research from multiple sources found that the Air Force MiG kill on 18 July actually occurred on 15 August by Captains Fred Sheffler (Aircraft Commander) and Mark Massen (Weapons System Officer) – (http://www.f-15estrikeeagle.com/facts/units/336fs.htm).
While enjoying a five day break from duty in the Gulf, Captain Edward W. Carter, III assumed command of Biddle in Subic Bay on 3 July. The North Carolina native enlisted in the Navy in 1945 for two years prior to entering the U.S Naval Academy. After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1951, he later earned a Master of Science degree from MIT in 1959. Captain Carter served in Sanborn (APA-193), LST 528, R. K. Huntington (DD-781), Boston (CAG-1), Farragut (DLG-8), and Long Beach (CGN-9). He commanded Towers (DDG-9).
With Biddle’s fifth commanding officer aboard, Biddle returned to the Gulf for her second line period. In an interview, FTG2 Jim Parks recalled Biddle’s arrival in the Gulf: “Once we were on station in Vietnam, we settled into a routine of watches, work, and sleep. Biddle was busy directing air strikes over North Vietnam at PIRAZ station, but jokingly we called it the “sitting duck station.” Biddle was often close enough to Vietnam to see individual trees on the shoreline, and we were steaming “dead slow.” I knew the VC didn’t really want us there, and I often wondered why they didn’t try to do something about it. “
Hard Charger! 