James Treadway
The war in Vietnam, though not militarily successful, was a complete success as far as the architects of the Leahy and Belknap classes of guided missile cruisers were concerned. In “When Computers Went to Sea”, Boslaugh states, “Off Vietnam, the Naval Tactical Data System was called on to perform, at some time, every tactical function envisioned by its designers, such as air intercept control, and gun and missile weapons direction, however, it was mainly pressed into new services. The heaviest load on the system was composed more of air traffic control functions than tactical battle functions, and the system was augmented with features such as the beacon video processor to give it more of such capability. “
Not only was the Gulf of Tonkin environment a proving ground the digital fleet, the Vietnam experience also served to eliminate fleet officer’s apprehension about sharing command with a sinister electronic brain, and removed all doubts about the utility of the new system.
While the early parts of the Vietnam war proved that NTDS could handle non-tactical assignments, Sterett’s and Biddle’s successful MiG engagements in the latter years of the war confirmed that Belknap Class frigates were capable of fulfilling their primary mission of defending battle group carriers and defending themselves. Flush with these successes and armed with a constant stream of improvements from the fleet by ships such as Biddle, engineers continued to improve the performance of NTDS with system upgrades while designing the next generation platform – the AEGIS combat system. Thus, from the WWII era fleet to today’s AEGIS based platforms, the CG-16/26 classes were the transition – from sailors, training, manning, operational techniques, and link management – it all was preparation for today’s fleet. This is the story of one ship, one tradition, emblematic of an era.
The remaining pages and chapters do not provide an exhaustive, historical analysis of this small part of the Vietnam War. Instead, they tell the stories of the officers and men who played deadly games with MiGs in the Gulf of Tonkin. They tell the story of a young lieutenant in CIC who makes a split second decision that will either save lives aboard his ship or get him court-martialed – he “bets his bars.” In another story, a MiG is so close to Sterett that the ship’s Terrier missile booster did not have time to separate – the entire missile actually made skin-to-skin contact with the MiG. We will answer probing questions: What happened in CIC when 500 knot MiGs are detected on the deck at a range less than 20 miles? What do Gunner’s Mates think when firing 3-inch proximity shells at night at a low flying invisible target?
These compelling stories demonstrate how ships were attacked and how they reacted. Granted, this little known part of the war was fought from the relative comfort of an air-conditioned CIC. From CIC, using the latest digital computers and long-range radar, well-trained sailors and officers controlled and directed the various types of weapons and countermeasures brought to bear. Fortunately, these systems and their operators succeeded because the Navy had the wisdom and foresight to envision and then design and implement the Naval Tactical Data System and integrate NTDS with shipboard sensors, communications, and weapons systems. A major contribution to at-sea success of these new systems that were based on digital computers and computer programs was due to the Navy decision to entrust these systems to a new breed of sailor who understood integrated systems, digital electronics, and computer programs.
The foundation of all ship operations in maintaining required levels of readiness prior to combat operations and in responding to problems during intense operations was then, and remains, specialized analysis tools and the sailors skilled in their use. During the era of early NTDS, which included Vietnam, this fundamental and vital component of weapon system success was being evolved and expanded by a combination of sailors, engineers, and computer programmers. While outside the scope of this book, some examples are provided to show the complexity of shipboard systems and the real-world environment in which men and machines must effectively function and interact to survive. In addition, the nature of early digital technology as it existed during this time required sailors to be innovative in detecting and correcting problems for which there were no precedents, often in the rigorous conditions of combat and round-the-clock operations. Today’s Navy ships are beneficiaries of the lessons learned and skills sharpened on those first ships of the digital revolution.
In the aftermath of the 1968 TET offensive, Biddle would begin Seventh Fleet operations in the Gulf of Tonkin after relieving the cruiser Chicago as PIRAZ control ship on 6 March. Considering the complexities of the mission, it might seem unusual that PIRAZ was Biddle’s first combat assignment. Biddle would be well prepared for the task, however. Immediately after commissioning, all tasks were subordinate to successful shakedown completion and preparation for PIRAZ.
An advanced team of Biddle officers visited PIRAZ in July of 1967, six months before departing for the Gulf of Tonkin. As a result of the visit, extensive changes in communications, Electronic Counter Measure (ECM), and additional crew berthing for the augmented PIRAZ crew were made. Additionally, Captain Scott developed a “new readiness posture that allowed continuous high level operational commitment with a minimum of disruption of shipboard day to day routine.” This posture allowed any combination of missile quarters, gun quarters, general quarters, and readiness condition Zebra to be set, which enabled Biddle to respond to any threat quickly and completely. Furthermore, Biddle had the ability to electronically simulate the Gulf of Tonkin airspace environment in CIC during the months prior to her arrival in the Gulf and heavy emphasis was placed on all tenets of Anti-Air Warfare. Biddle was as ready for PIRAZ and combat as a new warship could possibly be.
Missile Ship Duties in the Gulf of Tonkin
The role of the U.S. Navy during the Vietnam War had many facets. Brown water operations such as Market Time, Game Warden, and Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River and Delta (SEALORDS) are well documented in print and in film; Blue water operations at Yankee and Dixie Stations received considerable media attention as well. One lesser-known aspect of the Navy’s involvement in Vietnam is that ships equipped with Talos, Tartar, or Terrier missiles systems and the Naval Tactical Data System protected US Navy carrier groups to the south and engaged the North Vietnamese along the coast of North Vietnam and in the skies over the Gulf of Tonkin. These ships occupied PIRAZ and North or South Search and Rescue (SAR) stations. Often these ships operated within sight of the shores of North Vietnam and were escorted by a “shotgun” – an older gun-type destroyer that placed itself between the beach and the PIRAZ or SAR ship in case of attack from shore. PIRAZ operations were coordinated by NTDS ships designated as call sign “Red Crown,“ stationed between Yankee Station and the northern Tonkin Gulf.
PIRAZ
PIRAZ missions in 1968 involved multiple roles – the positive identification of all aircraft in the zone, advisory and positive control of aircraft, early warnings of hostile aircraft, warnings of impending border violations, and the identification and destruction of hostile aircraft. Other PIRAZ functions included locating and assisting stricken aircraft and emergency search and rescue. The volume of aircraft in the advisory zone often exceeded 100 and sometimes several hundred. Most radar contacts were U.S. Navy, Marine and Air Force aircraft on missions but there were South Vietnamese Air Force aircraft and commercial traffic as well. To further complicate matters, Red China was not far to the north and Hainan Island was just over the horizon to the east. PIRAZ was a demanding, dangerous environment.
NTDS equipped ships were the only surface combatants capable of performing all the tasks, and they were scarce. NTDS ships included large missile cruisers such as Chicago and the nuclear-powered Long Beach, and DLGs in the Belknap (including nuclear-powered Truxtun) and Leahy Class. Biddle’s contribution to this complex, constantly changing environment was urgently needed – hence the accelerated shakedown training. The hours were long and the rewards, beyond professional pride in accomplishing the missions, were few, but Biddle would quickly meet the challenge with three extended deployments in five years “on line” in the Gulf of Tonkin from her homeport of Norfolk.
Red Crown was located approximately 100 miles north of the widely known Yankee Station from which Navy carriers launched attacks on targets in North Vietnam. From this location, assigned ships performed PIRAZ missions. Biddle would monitor the entire northern war scene with her long-range air search radars, the SPS-40 and SPS-48. With North Vietnam 30 miles to the west and Yankee Station 100 miles to the south, the PIRAZ station was an ideal location from which shipboard air traffic controllers could identify and control friendly aircraft going to and coming from North Vietnam. Additionally, using NTDS tactical computer programs with large track capacity, ships did flight-following during ingress and egress. This was particularly important when raids were made up of many dozens of aircraft, both to keep track of the aircraft and to make sure that no hostile aircraft infiltrated formations of returning friendly aircraft. The sorting-out function was known as Tomcat.
Red Crown was also an excellent location to monitor enemy activity from the DMZ north to the border with China, often with the help of embarked intelligence systems and personnel known as “Spooks.” PIRAZ with other ships at NSAR and SSAR provided the first line of defense should North Vietnam decide to launch an attack against carriers at Yankee Station. Biddle would assume other duties in the Gulf of Tonkin, but none would be more critical to the conduct of the air war in the Gulf than as PIRAZ control ship.
The MiG Threat
PIRAZ was located approximately 30 miles southeast of Haiphong, North Vietnam’s largest port city. Sprinkled west from Haiphong to Hanoi and south to Vinh were numerous airfields from which MiGs launched sorties to the south toward the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and east or southeast to the Gulf of Tonkin. Occasionally, MiGS would go “feet wet” at very high speed in the direction of naval forces only to break off the attack at the last moment. They would also fly below hilltops when “feet dry” to make it more difficult to track them by radar. In either case, any MiG activity anywhere in North Vietnam got instant attention from the US Navy in the Gulf.
NTDS equipped ships with long-range air search radars and missiles were an ideal platform to engage MiGs and great sport was made of it. One of the first ships to receive NTDS, the nuclear-powered Long Beach, fired Talos missiles at seven MiGs during 1967 and 1968 (Boslaugh 354). She made history on 23 May 1968 when she destroyed a MiG at a range of 65 miles with a Talos missile after engaging a target that was first tracked and reported by other ships with long-range radar using NTDS consoles, computers, and digital data links (354). (There is now an automated system for ships and aircraft known as Cooperative Engagement Capability or CEC. The concept has been extended so the unit performing the engagement can be separate from the unit launching the weapon. This concept was central to the aborted Arsenal Ship.) The event was the first time that an enemy aircraft was shot down by a ship-launched surface-to-air missile. Long Beach shot down her second MiG in June 1968, again at a range of 65 miles (354). By war’s end in 1975, only three other naval combatants would successfully engage MiGs with missiles or gunfire, though there were other missile firings that did not intercept. There is not an official count of how many MIGs were shot down by Navy missiles or guns. However, Warship International credits only Long Beach, Chicago, and guided missile frigates Sterett, and Biddle with five confirmed kills and two probable kills (Gibbs 319). Indeed, warships that shot down a MiG are a select group. In contrast, USN and USMC air-to-air combat MiGs kills were predictably more plentiful with 122 enemy aircraft shot down and 16 known USN/USMC aircraft lost to MiGs, a 7.6 to 1 exchange rate (Nichols 167).
Playing games with hostile MiGs was not easy. The minimum requirements to play the game successfully were a highly trained crew and perfectly functioning equipment. If either element was lacking, a fortunate MiG pilot would live to fly another day or a warship took a hit with a 250-pound bomb. Hostile MiGs were not the only threat to Navy ships fortunate enough to pull duty in the Gulf of Tonkin. North Vietnamese patrol boats, some equipped with anti-ship missiles, were a threat from the DMZ north along the coastline to the border with China. North Vietnamese gun emplacements occasionally shelled ships that operated inside the range of their guns. Sadly, another threat to naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin – friendly fire – took its toll as well.
Engaging MiGs with guns and missiles was not the only option available to NTDS equipped ships – a more successful tactic was to use air intercept controllers to direct Navy or Air Force fighters to hostile targets on the controller’s screen. In When Computers Went to Sea, Boslaugh states that Biddle conducted 168 fighter intercepts during her three deployments to Vietnam and that on her third deployment, Biddle controllers were responsible for directing 13 MiG kills (355). Shipboard intercept controllers chalked up their earliest kills in 1967 when Fox (DLG-33) intercept controllers downed a MiG 17 and MiG 21 (354). Shortly before Sterett’s Dong Hoi engagement in April 1972, her intercept controllers directed Air Force fighters in a MiG-21 splash in February then two more MiGs in March. Senior Chief Radarman Larry Nowell directed Air Force and Navy fighters to 12 MiG kills in 1972 from his NTDS console aboard Chicago, winning the Distinguished Service Cross in the process (355). Finally, Truxtun was credited with 11 MiG intercept kills during her 1972-73 Gulf deployment (355).
North and South Search and Rescue
The Navy’s efforts during the early phases of the war to retrieve downed pilots from North Vietnam and adjacent waters were successful an average of only one in six attempts (Nichols 119). Furthermore, by 1967 the Navy had lost at least seven helos to the enemy during SAR missions (120). Without a dedicated organization trained specifically for combat SAR, the poor performance would have continued. Soon after Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Seven (HC-7) was formed, losses dropped to zero (120).
Ships bound for SAR or PIRAZ duty took aboard a permanent helo detachment consisting of a Landing Signal Officer (LSO), damage controlmen, fueling personnel, and chock men. Ships such as Biddle also had limited capabilities for helicopter maintenance. The general procedure was to position modified Sikorsky SH-3A “Big Mother” helos aboard ships at North SAR and South SAR as close to the egress point as possible. During major strikes, SAR helos would become airborne and orbit offshore to reduce even further the time required to reach and rescue a downed pilot.
The nature of the job entailed considerable risk. On Yankee Station described two SAR missions that illustrate the point. The first story, while not a Navy SAR mission, reveals the extreme risks that were sometimes taken. The mission involved an Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) attempt to rescue a Navy Crusader pilot southwest of Dodge (Hanoi.) The HH-3 crew had located the downed pilot and was hovering inches above the triple canopy jungle. The jungle penetrator cable was lowered to its limits but was too short and NVA soldiers were putting bullet holes in the fuselage. Rather than add power and “Get the hell out of Dodge,” the pilot lowered the HH-3 into the trees enough that the F-8 pilot was finally able to grab the sling. Unfortunately, the rotor blades were “cutting timber” and losing rotor blade tips. Now severely damaged and almost uncontrollable, the HH-3 pilot made it to a nearby clearing where a Jolly Green picked up survivors and the damaged HH-3 was lifted out later that night. The F-8 driver was rescued but several HH-3 crewmen were injured and one was killed.
The other story involved a back-seater who ejected out of a RA-5C Vigilante near the coast during a reconnaissance mission. The pilot was killed and locals had surrounded the back-seater, who was carrying a standard issue .38 pistol with the first two chambers empty, and a .22 automatic. He had waded into the water where a local militia took his .38 and pointed it at the flyer while another North Vietnamese civilian covered him with a rifle. At that time the aviator could see the SAR helo approaching from the east and an A1 and F8 strafing the beach. The RESCAP pilots could see the predicament the flyer was in so they continued to distract the Vietnamese with low-level strafing. The distraction provided the young aviator with enough time to extract and load his .22 pistol. The rifleman caught a bullet in the head, which caused the other Vietnamese to reflexively pull the trigger of the .38 pistol. Since the first two chambers were empty, the flyer had enough time load and fire again. With the last militiaman floating in the surf, the back-seater started swimming at flank speed toward the SAR helo and rescue.
Often Biddle pulled SAR duty and was either directly or indirectly involved in rescuing downed pilots. On 16 June 1968, Biddle assumed NSAR responsibilities while retaining the PIRAZ function. At first light, Biddle closed Jouett, received the “Clementine Two” helo and detachment, and then proceeded to NSAR while Jouett headed south. Three days later, Lieutenant (junior grade) Trump remembers, “I recall staying up far beyond the end of my watch one evening listening to the radio chatter as a SAR helicopter made a daring rescue in the DMZ and barely made it back to South SAR – the pilot was subsequently awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.” The following citation from the web site http://www.medalofhonor.com describes the action:
Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as pilot and aircraft commander of a search and rescue helicopter, attached to Helicopter Support Squadron 7, during operations against enemy forces in North Vietnam. Launched shortly after midnight to attempt the rescue of 2 downed aviators, Lt. (then Lt. (J.G.)) Lassen skillfully piloted his aircraft over unknown and hostile terrain to a steep, tree-covered hill on which the survivors had been located. Although enemy fire was being directed at the helicopter, he initially landed in a clear area near the base of the hill, but, due to the dense undergrowth, the survivors could not reach the helicopter. With the aid of flare illumination, Lt. Lassen successfully accomplished a hover between 2 trees at the survivors’ position Illumination was abruptly lost as the last of the flares were expended, and the helicopter collided with a tree, commencing a sharp descent. Expertly righting his aircraft and maneuvering clear, Lt. Lassen remained in the area, determined to make another rescue attempt, and encouraged the downed aviators while awaiting resumption of flare illumination. After another unsuccessful, illuminated rescue attempt, and with his fuel dangerously low and his aircraft significantly damaged, he launched again and commenced another approach in the face of the continuing enemy opposition. When flare illumination was again lost, Lt. Lassen, fully aware of the dangers in clearly revealing his position to the enemy, turned on his landing lights and completed the landing. On this attempt, the survivors were able to make their way to the helicopter. En route to the coast he encountered and successfully evaded additional hostile antiaircraft fire and, with fuel for only 5 minutes of flight remaining, landed safely aboard U.S.S. Jouett (DLG-29).
On Saturday, 21 April 2001, the Department of the Navy commissioned the Arleigh Burke Class guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG-82).
Hard Charger! 