Battle at PIRAZ

James Treadway

Eventually the North Vietnamese did try to do something about Biddle’s presence 30 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. Lieutenant Ralph Muse, senior officer in CIC when the attack started, recalled that on the night prior to the attack, 18 July 1972, there was very little U.S. Navy air activity over North Vietnam due to the bad weather. However, MiG activity was much higher than normal with more than 50 missions and Biddle was tracking as many as 15 MiGs at one time. CWO2 Gunner O’Neal, sitting at the Ship’s Weapons Coordinator (SWC) console, also noticed the increased MiG activity, particularly in an area that he suspected was a bombing range. Gunner describes the activity:

On the night before the attack, Ralph and I were on Condition III watch in CIC from 2000 to 2400 hours, Captain Carter was at the movies. Lieutenant Muse, over a period of time, had told me things of a sensitive nature to allow me to do my job as SWC better. So I jokingly told Lieutenant Muse to tell the “spooks” [Spooks were on-board intelligence personnel who intercepted and translated conversations between the North Vietnamese] that if I knew there was a bombing range in North Vietnam I would think that they were practicing dive-bombing attacks from about 35,000 feet. He spoke with them and confirmed what I was seeing. After the movie the Captain came to CIC on his way to his cabin and asked Ralph how things were going. Ralph told him OK and went on to tell him about the MiGs. Captain Carter told Lieutenant Muse, “You had better let me know if that ever happens again.”

The next night according to Lieutenant Muse “was very quiet. There was no North SAR ship on station, no [air] activity [over North Vietnam] from our side, and no flights by the MiGs….that was, until late on the 20:00 to 24:00 watch.” CWO3 Jerry Van Cleave was on watch in CIC as SWC when Gunner relieved him early. Van Cleave recalled that “Lieutenant Commander Ray Witter was my Combat Directions Center (CDC) coordinator and was due to be relieved by Lieutenant Ralph Muse who had the mid watch. I believe Lieutenant Jim Mleziva was on the bridge as OOD. I don’t remember where the captain was at the time but that wouldn’t have made any difference since we were operating under the CDC concept (new at the time) where the evaluators were delegated the authority to deploy weapons. After being relieved, I transited the wardroom en route to my stateroom. If I recall, the helicopter crew was hanging out there. I may have had a short cup of coffee with them before heading down to my stateroom.”

Lieutenant Muse and Gunner were on watch when a single A-6 went feet dry on a bombing run. Two Barrier Combat Air Patrols (BARCAP) were in their normal “feet wet” position in the far northern Gulf. Gunner continues: “Ralph told the Captain [about the A-6] who told him to keep him apprised of the progress. When the A6 came on the radio saying he had been hit and his co-pilot had been hurt, the Captain was notified and came to CIC. We [Biddle] were the PIRAZ ship, Harbormaster, and the SAR coordinator for the Gulf, so we were monitoring the situation. Alpha Whiskey (Task Force 77) told one of the BARCAPs to escort the A6 to the Midway and the other one to stay on station to the south of PIRAZ. This [also] caused the secure voice relay plane to also go south as there was no protection for it with only one BARCAP. “

RD1 Jerry Kronvall was the controller who picked up the wounded A-6’s distress call, “An A-6 aircraft was hit by AAA or by a missile and I answered his mayday call. I was controlling him back to his carrier and talking with the carrier’s Air Controller Supervisor. When the A-6 was within 30 miles of the carrier the carrier Air Intercept Controllers (AIC) took control of the A-6. [Footnote: Never did find out how the pilot made out.] During this time Captain Carter was called to CIC and he stood behind me observing the A-6 mayday condition.”

As Ships Combat Evaluator, Lieutenant Muse asked the duty officer at the 7th Fleet command center aboard the Kitty Hawk to launch the ALERT-5 CAP – two F-4s or F-8s ready to launch within five minutes. 7th Fleet denied the request since the next BARCAP was scheduled to launch in less than an hour and besides, “nothing was going on tonight.” This decision left Biddle and all ships in the northern gulf with substantially reduced defenses if the fleet was attacked by air. Muse also remembered that there was no ship stationed at NSAR at that time.

Approximately five minutes after the BARCAPS had departed, Gunner recalled that “Lieutenant Muse, who was on the phone with the spooks, told me to check the area south of Hanoi. I hit the Seesaw and painted three MiGs. I assigned missiles systems to the target and the radars got a lock on the target.” The targets had been designated “hostile” in the NTDS – their symbols on all screens now reflected this fact.

At that moment DS1 Terry Johnstone was the “on-duty” data systems technician in CIC. He recalled that since there were no air strikes at the time he was monitoring the NTDS from an unused console in CIC. His attention was suddenly diverted to the three hostile tracks that suddenly appeared on his screen. Believing that the tracks were mistakenly entered, he turned to inform Lieutenant Muse that someone had incorrectly identified some targets. Johnstone saw that Lieutenant Muse was talking on the phone while hovering over the operator on the Evaluator console. Terry now realized that the tracks were very hostile, very fast, and very close.

RD1 Kronvall stated that “our ‘magic’ boxes started to sound the alarm that a MiG or MiGs were close to us. This was about 2215 to 2225 (1015/1025 PM). They were close, at 7.5 to 9 miles – our 48 radar picked them up and automatic tracking was taking place.”

“Clear The Fo’c’sle…Fire One…Fire Two…General Quarters!”

Ships Weapons Coordinator CWO2 L. L. “Gunner” O’Neil was the first to spot the MiGs. In addition to the radar “skin” paint, Seesaw verified the MiG’s presence with its own signal. Gunner remembers that “the Captain had been notified that one of the BARCAPs was escorting a shot up A-6 back to the carrier. Since the movie was in process he told Ralph to keep him apprised of the status of the CAP. Shortly thereafter we had MiGs feet wet and after acquiring them on the missile systems, the launcher was assigned and the Captain was informed and he said to sound GQ.”

With the MiGs “feet wet” less than 20 miles away, and knowing that no friendly aircraft were airborne except the BARCAP to the south, Lieutenant Muse immediately passed the word over the 1MC general announcing system to “Clear the fo’c’sle,” then gave the order to fire a salvo of two missiles at the lead MiG. Two birds were on their way within seconds. Gunner noted that the “remaining BARCAP reported a downrange explosion which turned out to be a confirmed kill on one of the MiGs.” Then, Gunner announced General Quarters while Lieutenant Muse belatedly made the request for permission to fire at the incoming MiGs from 7th Fleet at Yankee Station.

Gunner O’Neal remembered that “while everyone was getting to their stations Ralph ordered to fire the two missiles that had been loaded. The Captain and all of the regular GQ folks showed up to take charge. I firmly believe that the first two missiles were fired at Ralph’s order and everything else was at Captain Carter’s direction. I will say that Ralph and I were very busy, he was watching what I was doing and talking to the folks in “spookland” and trying to get the Captain and the OP’s boss briefed on what had transpired and was going on. I was assigning Systems and talking on both radio and sound power phones to the rest of our condition III watch team. I feel the team did a great job, more than I had expected, and in fact saved the ship in those first minutes of confusion when the ship was going to GQ. “
CWO Van Cleave noted “about fifteen minutes (give or take a few) after being relieved, I heard two Terriers leave the rail and the GQ klaxon sound almost simultaneously. I had just arrived outside my stateroom. Since we were operating under a GQ watch bill, (personnel currently on station, remained on station) I hustled up to, and ducked into Supplemental Radio (SUPRAD). Other CIC personnel were supposed to go to their standby stations.”
Gunner remembers “the ship went to general quarters in their usual slow manner since GQ was a common occurrence. When the missiles were launched the crew really came together. The old timers were helping the new comers and the repair parties were in battle dress, ready to do their jobs. Everything seemed to go like clockwork. After the two missiles were fired there was a brief lull. The captain released our shotgun and told them to stay out of our way and defend themselves. The USS Gray did so. During this time I was using Seesaw nearly every sweep of the radar trying to find the other MIGs, Ralph had told me there were five of them.”
According to Lieutenant Muse, “The launcher was loaded with two more Terrier missiles within 30 seconds and ready to fire. Both missiles were quickly dispatched toward the second MiG. The first MiG had disappeared from the radar screen when the fire control radar range rate went to zero, indicating destruction of the first MiG. Topside personnel verified an explosion on the horizon, and crewmen aboard Biddle’s shotgun, the USS Gray, also confirmed the kill. The second MiG, apparently after observing the destruction of his wingman and knowing that he had been locked on by Biddle’s fire control radar, turned toward home and managed to evade the missile salvo heading directly at him.”

CWO Van Cleave confirmed Muse’s account, “Just as I was hustling up the starboard ladder to SUPRAD I heard the second set of Terriers leave the rail. If my memory serves, that was about a minute (maybe less) after the first two. A few minutes after (or during) the second terrier firing the OOD (Jim Mleziva) executed a hard starboard turn and increased to flank speed. I assumed that Jim was initiating a high-speed zigzag.
OS1 Kronvall, contrary to Muse’s and Gunner’s accounts, recalled a different sequence of events after the hostile targets were detected: “Captain Carter ordered the missile personnel to engage the MiGs. Two SM2’s departed the ship when the MiGs were about five to six miles from us. The ship warning alarms were located in CIC as well as the bridge, and the Quarterdeck. Captain Carter then pushed the button for the general quarters alarm. The alarm sounded about three times and another two missiles left the rail.”

While Lieutenant Muse was still trying to get “birds free” from 7th Fleet and talking with the “spooks” in the radio room, Captain Carter arrived in CIC, where, according to Lieutenant Muse, “the next thing I felt was Captain Carter’s hand on my back and ‘What the hell have you done!’ in my ear.”

The spooks verified that the second MiG had returned to base. Lieutenant Muse remembers “After what seemed like eternity, the duty officer at 7th Fleet, a Commander I knew personally, laughed and gave us permission to fire – which we had done at least five minutes earlier.”

A short time after MiG #2 went feet dry (approximately 15 minutes according to Muse) the second phase of the attack began when Biddle’s surface search radar detected MiGs at 500 knots on the deck at seven miles range. Seconds later, both air search radars picked up the targets but the fire control radar was unable to lock on and hold the targets. Biddle’s remaining defense was her port and starboard 3-inch guns and her 5-inch gun. Unfortunately, the 5-inch gun’s fire control system was down with an inoperative amplidyne motor, which meant the gun could be trained in Manual mode only. Also, the 3-inch guns were optical (no radar guidance) and intended for daylight only.

Jerry Kronvall’s recollection was that,

Shortly after that our guns opened up and I believe that two more missiles left the ship when the guns were firing. No one came on the 1MC to say “General quarters, general quarters, man your battle stations.” Usually it took the crew about seven to nine minutes to man GQ stations – that night it took less than five minutes.

The captain directed me to find some fighter aircraft as we gave control of the aircraft to another ship well before the attack. Captain Carter turned his attention back to the MiGs.
I was watching the scope as the MiGs overflew the ship. [Author’s note: All other accounts mention a single MiG passing over the ship.] I was feeling there was no place to run, no place to hide and here I’m sitting in front of a console that has high voltage and if the scope blew out, I would be history. Not a good feeling.

There was a report from the bridge that two explosion had occurred in the air. I though that a missile got one MIG on their first run at us. The guns got the second MIG on the second run at us. Before the second missiles left the ship I went on the air control circuit and found two fighter aircraft being refueled in the air. I took control of both aircraft and had them call out their fuel state, one fighter was just coming off the bag and the other fighter had to be refueled. I directed the one fighter aircraft to us and the second fighter to refuel. The first fighter saw and reported explosions near the Biddle. Chief Bump took control of the second AIC console and I briefed him to what was going on. He was manning the console as the guns started to fire.

The ship’s missile fire control finally locked on sufficiently to fire a salvo of two more missiles. According to Lieutenant Muse, the range rate again went to zero indicating a direct hit and the spooks heard the third MiG report the hit. Meanwhile, the port side 3-inch gun had opened fire using influence fuzes and the 5-inch gun, after manually training to port, had opened fire as well. Lieutenant Muse remembered that “By this time, the last plane was inside the minimum range of the missile system. The spooks were telling me that the pilot had us in his sight and was going to kill us. Captain Carter was giving the bridge orders for evasive maneuvering. The last plane went dead center over the ship. I was waiting for the explosion. It never came. What happened? Why were we not hit? We may never know. “

CWO Van Cleave recalled that,

While we were in our first turn, the 5-inch 54 on the stern started firing. We were accustomed to having daily gunnery drills but were never able to get ten rounds out of a barrel without some sort of delay. I’m told that during the engagement of 19 July we fired 54 rounds of 5-inch 54 ordinance – I didn’t count them. And, I never heard a pause from the first round to the last. I’m not a weapons type, but I could guess that ye old 5-inch 54 barrel was a wee bit hot. One of the results of the gun crew’s performance was that we never held another gunnery drill from that day until the day we departed the Gulf. As for the old 3-inch 50 guns (port and starboard amidships) they started a few seconds behind the 5-inch 54 and just kept rattling. I have no idea how many rounds of 3-inch 50 ammunition we expended. I do know that is was a significant amount.

DS1 Johnstone, now at his battle station one level below CIC, remembers that

We had fired guns and missiles only on the ranges in the Caribbean. I do not remember that I had ever experienced two guns firing while missiles were being launched. We experienced it in those next few minutes. With the 3-inch gun and 5-inch gun firing the ship was bouncing around like a cork on the ocean. Two more missiles flew as we continued to fire the guns.
Conversation on the battle phone confirmed that we were probably being attacked by five MiGs out of Hanoi. We were told that Hanoi tower was being monitored and that there was knowledge that the aircraft were launching and that they were coming out to “get us”. There was a report that one of the signal men had seen one of the air planes pass very low between the macks and disappear.
That quickly it was over. The shooting stopped and I think “Charge” was played top side. Captain Carter came on the 1MC and told us that we had saved the ship. He told us that we were the first U.S. naval vessel since World War II to use barrage fire as a defense. He said that our “shot gun” reported that we looked like “the Fourth of July” at the height of the battle, with all of the shells exploding and the missiles leaving the rails.

Lieutenant Muse recalls, ”I never again had to ask twice for CAP support from 7th Fleet Command. In a day or two, we went south to a safer position and replaced the missiles we fired, and we hosted a small group of Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Navy Department civilian “experts” who could not understand how the North Vietnamese could come that close to sinking one of our ships. The “experts” insisted that the North Vietnamese would never attack at night, and that it would be a high altitude attack. Another interesting thing about this attack was that it did not make the news; no one knew what we had done. We were never officially there – but we were just glad to get back home in one piece.”

As the attack unfolded 7th Fleet began to respond to a threat that, if left unchecked, would threaten not only Biddle, but elements at Yankee Station as well. OS1 Kronvall recalled that

In the Gulf of Tonkin that night were three carriers. One was in standdown; two were available to launch aircraft. It seems that the carriers picked up my voice radio transmissions to the fighter aircraft that we were under attack by MiGs.

After the second fighter departed refueling, which took about 10 to 15 minutes; he was directed to his playmate. Chief Bump and I heard that more fighters were up in the air from two carriers. The third carrier (I believe) came out of the 24 hour standdown and had launched their fighters. By this time the attack was over and the remaining MiGs had returned to their home plates. I used the first fighter to try to cut the MiGs off but they [the MiGs] were moving too fast for an intercept so I joined up the two fighters as soon as I could.

As for the carriers that launched their aircraft, we had about 40 to 60 fighters from the carriers. Da Nang Marines launched their fighters and I believe there were about 10 to 12 sections of two fighters per section. Plus we had about 75 tankers to refuel everybody. It was quite busy. In summary, the North Vietnam planners did some planning. We had no aircraft under our control; their planes were under our radar until they flew into our radar signals. They did not take into account that the Biddle crew would be that good. The crew was outstanding.

With the attack over, Gunner recalled “As usually happens in a period of great stress a few ‘funny’ things happen. As I went to get into battle dress I found that I didn’t have a life jacket. One of the other SWC’s had taken it. Also while Captain Carter was talking to Alpha Whiskey (AW) on secure voice making arrangements for the rearming, AW asked if there was anything else that we needed. Captain Carter told him to send about 500 pucker strings as ours were pretty well stretched.”

While not particularly funny, CWO Van Cleaves remembered that “The launch of the first two terriers caught the bridge crew unaware. I might say that the Gulf of Tonkin can get very hot in July. So the bridge crew had all of the bridge windows open to catch whatever cool breezes possible. When the first two missiles left the rail all of the smoke and other launch debris engulfed the bridge (inside as well as outside). The bridge personnel couldn’t get the bridge windows closed fast enough.”

Lieutenant Muse’s performance during the attack was a classic example of a young, well-trained naval officer “betting his bars” that he made the correct decision when all of the outcomes had serious, if not catastrophic, consequences. If he had decided to launch a missile and the target was friendly, then he would have to explain his decision at his probable court martial. If he followed established procedure, then it likely would have been too late and the MiGs would have been too close. (In an interview, Lieutenant Muse explained that the procedure was “…to call the Captain, ask 7th Fleet for birds free on the track number of the MIG, then wait until both the Captain and 7th Fleet gave permission to fire.”) If he stood around idle and made no decision, then he could have been court-martialed for dereliction of duty…assuming he survived the attack.

Topside Action

Hard Charger! would not be complete without the accounts of the young men who manned Biddle’s guns that night; for the outcome of the brief battle hinged on the performance of these teenage men as much as on the officers and men in CIC, the bridge, and the missile rooms. On a ship bristling with high tech computers, radars, and missiles, Biddle may have survived the attack intact because the performance level of the men operating a pair of WWII style 3-inch guns and a broken 5-inch gun system far exceeded anything achieved in practice.

“This is no shit. We were supposed to make a Med cruise but went to Vietnam instead. We shot down a couple of MiGs.” That is how a Biddle gunners mate might start a sea story describing the events of July 19. Jokingly, all sea stories begin that way, but the truth may follow; the reader should pay attention.

FTG2 Jim Parks, as Mount 32 Director, had a unique vantage point from which he could observe the action. The mount director’s position is one level above, and behind the gun, closer to amidships. Jim described the director as “a large telescope mounted on a pivot, with handlebars for steering. In theory, I was to follow the target with the gun director, and a gyroscope mechanism inside would generate a lead angle for the gun. I received orders from the Weapons Officer over my sound powered telephone (a headset device), and passed the orders to the 3-inch gun mount under my direction. There was a firing key on the gun director that allowed me to shoot the 3-inch gun when it was under my control.”

If you have wondered, as I have, what it’s like to be topside when missiles are fired at real MiGs, and the ship is lobbing 3-inch and 5-inch projectiles at an approaching enemy, then wonder no more. Jim Parks describes the action from the Mount 32 Director:

The night of 19 July 1972 had been no different from any other night up until bedtime. We had been in Vietnam almost two months, and the days had become a dull, boring routine. I don’t remember exactly, but either I watched the movie on the mess deck, or played spades, or both that night, as was my usual habit. I do remember that I went to bed promptly at 10 PM.
It was about 15 minutes later when the general quarters alarm sounded. Not being quite asleep yet, I jumped up, jammed my legs into my pants, and rushed to my battle station at the Port Gun Director. While I was running through the ship, I heard the first round of missiles being fired topside. I was the first one at the AA station, with Mount 31 Gun Director FTGSN John Potratz, right behind me. We donned our flak jackets, helmets, and sound powered telephones. Suddenly, the forecastle lit up with an explosion of flame and sounds. For a few seconds, I was afraid that we had been hit! Once I saw our Terrier missile streaking away from the ship, I knew that we were under attack because a second round of missiles meant serious business. Watching a missile launch at night is quite spectacular; the smoke and flames from the exhaust temporarily produced an eerie glow around the forecastle.

I switched my sound powered telephone to the proper circuit, so that I could hear orders from the weapons officer in Combat Information Center. The Anti-Aircraft (AA) officers were just arriving at the AA station when I heard the weapons officer over my headset shouting “Mount 32, commence fire!” I realized instantly that the enemy must be close if they were ordering us to shoot. I switched my phone to the gun circuit, and passed the “commence fire” order to GMG3 Ron Straight, the Mount 32 Gun Captain. The AA officers were getting outfitted with flak jackets, helmets, and phones when I shouted to them that we had been given the “commence fire” order, turned my director, and began shooting portside.

The Vietnamese picked a great night for an attack; it was a moonless night, with a high overcast, absolutely no light whatsoever. I had no idea what I was shooting at, but I shot at the dark as ordered. After firing 20 or so rounds, one of the AA officers gave me the order to “cease fire.” I released my firing key, and passed the cease-fire order to Mount 32. For the next few minutes all was calm.
This quietness only gave me time to worry – our MK68 gun director, which had broken down only a few days before, normally controlled our main 5-inch gun. The amplidyne that supplied electrical current to the motor that turned the director had failed, and it would be another week or two before the new amplidyne being shipped from the states could be installed.
CIC and the bridge must have been a busy place that night. Biddle began turning sharply, causing me to hold tightly to a rail to keep my balance. Captain Carter had ordered Biddle to turn her portside toward the enemy. Over my sound powered telephone, I heard the weapons officer tell the 5-inch gun crew that there were enemy gun boats approaching the ship, and to swing the gun in that general direction. Although the MK68 gun director was broken and could not turn automatically, FTG2 Jim Wilson was underneath turning a small hand crank, causing the MK68 to turn toward the targets in an attempt to get a radar lock. The 5-inch gun had switched to local control, so that it didn’t have to depend on the MK68 gun director.

Suddenly, the 5-inch gun erupted into rapid fire. I turned around, expecting to receive instructions from our AA officers, but the officers were gone! I looked at Mount 31 director John Potratz, and he was pointing down to the deck – both AA officers were face down with their hands over their heads! They were terrified! [The explanation for this scene is explained fully in the next chapter. Apparently, the two officers were actually helicopter pilots who were caught topside during the heavy action and were seeking shelter.]
After a brief moment of astonishment, I regained my composure, and then switched my sound powered telephone to the weapons circuit. I heard the order “Mount 32, commence fire portside” being shouted, as though they had been trying to get the message to us. I then relayed the commence fire order to the gun captain, and we began shooting. Once again, a pair of Terrier missiles lit up the front end of the ship, and zoomed off toward their target.

Half blinded by the Terrier missile launch, I was quite surprised that I could see through my director sights that the proximity shells that we were firing were exploding – they must have hit a target! I saw four or five puffs of light and smoke as the shells exploded. It didn’t dawn on me at the time how close a target must have been to the Biddle for a 3” shell to hit. Gun Captain Ron Straight later confirmed the exploding shells that I saw. I was temporarily deafened by the gunfire, but several others that were topside told me that they heard the MiG fly over us. A few crewmembers claimed that they saw the jet exhaust from the MiG as it flew overhead.

With the Terrier missiles forward, the 5-inch gun aft, and our 3-inch gun amidships, all firing at the same time, it was said that the USS Biddle was the first ship since WWII to put up a barrage of fire against an enemy.
I later learned that the gunboats approaching the Biddle turned and sped away as soon as the 5-inch gun began shooting at them. I also learned that the first round of Terrier missiles downed one MiG, and the second round of Terrier’s probably downed a second MiG. It was never confirmed, but the proximity shells that the 3-inch was shooting likely damaged a 3rd MiG. I would like to think that although the 3rd MiG may have been close enough to us to open fire, it was too busy dodging our gunfire to act. The remaining MiGs then tucked tail and flew back to shore. We stayed at general quarters for at least another half-hour and maybe longer.
After we secured from our battle stations, I went below to the mess deck, and poured myself a large glass of chocolate milk. A large number of the crew congregated on the mess deck, unable to go back to sleep; many of us were half expecting another attack and wanted to be ready. After an hour or so, I had calmed down enough that I could go down to my compartment, and sleep peacefully the rest of the night.

In the following weeks, I began to realize the significance of that event. Due to our constant training and drills, the Biddle crew had performed flawlessly. The officers and crew in CIC had picked out the threat immediately and reacted swiftly. Captain Carter chose to position our portside toward the enemy to bring maximum firepower to bear against all threats. The engineering department brought the ship from dead slow to maximum speed in record time. The missile gang and the gunners met the oncoming attack with confidence in their skills and equipment. If any single department had failed its job that night, I’m sure the outcome would have been much different. In my opinion, the USS Biddle was the finest ship to ever sail, and I owe my life to everyone on board her that night.

Mount 32 Gun Captain Ron Straight substantiates Jim Park’s recollection:

The memory that I have is a little rusty from the years passing. Here is a brief synopsis: General Quarters was called around midnight. Ron Tanner and I were the gunners mates in charge of Mount 32. The gun radar that controlled the guns was not working. All hands that were assigned to Mount 32 were present and waiting with anxiety shortly after GQ sounded.

Approximately the time all hands arrived on location, another missile was launched. A short period of time passed, then suddenly, the ship made an abrupt starboard turn. When the ship straightened out, Ron and I were told to commence fire, peppering the sky at a ninety-degree angle. When the cease-fire order was given, Mount 32 had fired approximately 35 rounds without the gun jamming, which was a first. While everyone was still on edge, there were supposedly small boats spotted on the horizon. The story that I received later was that the boats were US Navy PT boats looking for anything that had been shot down.

Ron Straight does not remember the gun jamming but GMG2 Ron “Mad Dog” Tanner clearly remembers a hang fire on the last shell. “Mad Dog” explains:

We did get off about 28 rounds that night. The gun was designed for 60 rounds per minute but was manually loaded and never came close to that. The previous best before that night was 15-20 rounds to the best of my recollection. The last shell was a “hang-fire,” and after attempting everything else we could think of, we elevated the gun straight up, and Buck took the shell and threw it over the side. It was to say the least a pretty tense moment. 

I can’t really remember if Mount 31, the starboard mount, got off any rounds or not. Most of the action was on the port side and Mount 32 put up the barrage fire. I believe a total of four terrier missiles were fired. After we started firing, I could hear the 5-inch 54 caliber commence firing a few minutes later, and it was a welcome sound. Everyone worked great together that night, and I have always been proud to serve with the crew of DLG-34.

Other Accounts and Conclusions

At Biddle’s decommissioning on 30 November 1993, Biddle’s commanding officer during the attack, Rear Admiral Ed Carter U.S. Navy (Retired), described the events:

On the memorable night of 19 July 1972, Biddle went through two air attacks against herself. First, a raid of three [MiGs], which launched from Hanoi Julong (sic) airfield. Biddle launched a two-missile salvo and destroyed the lead MiG at a range of seventeen miles, and the other two turned back home to think about it.

Fifteen minutes later, a second raid of two airplanes at very low altitude closed Biddle from the west. How low were they? Well, the first radar to pick them up was the surface search radar. Range was inside seven miles when they were picked up. Reconstruction of NTDS indicated their speed was slightly over 500 knots. That doesn’t give you much time, and that doesn’t give you a whole lot of chance when their altitude was so low that missile radars could not lock on and we could not engage with missiles.

The 5-inch gun fire control radar was CASREP, and the 3-inch guns were optical control systems only. So Biddle resorted to an old World War II tactic used against Japanese torpedo planes – we went into barrage fire, zero degrees elevation, influence fuses, so that every round that fired would at least trigger on the water. And in the midst of this maelstrom, one airplane disappeared. The other one passed overhead of this girl with their (sic) engines screaming followed by a deadly silence that lasted forever while we waited for what we thought would be the bomb that got us, to fall on us, but it did not.

I had the opportunity, and took the opportunity to walk around the ship after we finally secured from general quarters. I found the post attack unity that existed on this ship far exceeded anything that we had previously experienced in a ship where the attitude was already, “One for all and all for one.” The crew in that night engagement had given their best. And I suppose that at least two or three of them thought that they might be called upon to give their all. There was no boasting and no bragging, just a sense of silent pride in having been tested and found not wanting.

Biddle’s battle with five hostile MiGs raises a question – why did the MiG that flew directly over Biddle not drop a bomb? A mechanical malfunction or battle damage could be the reason, but I wonder if the pilot screwed up. The pilot probably knew that Biddle had just blown one, possibly two, of his comrades out of the sky. His MiG is on the deck going like a rat shot in the nuts, and it’s as dark as a whore’s heart. The only source of light is the flash from Biddle’s guns and missiles. He had one hand on the stick and the other hand on the ejection seat release. If he had a third hand, it would be scratching his head while wondering how he’s going to get out of this mess. Fortunately for Biddle, the nervous MiG pilot had misjudged the closure rate while dodging exploding 3-inch and 5-inch projectiles. Biddle’s darkened outline suddenly appeared directly in front of the startled pilot. His fire control was locked on, but as his shaking hand found the lever that would pickle a bomb, Biddle’s form passed underneath him, his opportunity forever lost.

Biddle narrowly avoided disaster. The Navy’s most sophisticated radars and computers and a ferocious barrage of missile salvos and gunfire allowed one MiG to penetrate Biddle’s defenses to do whatever damage it could. The low altitude, high speed night attack would probably have been an even bigger surprise had it not been for the recently installed Shortstop system. Lieutenant Muse believes that Shortstop allowed Biddle an extra two minutes to prepare a defense – two minutes that may have saved the ship.

DSC Rodney Merrill recalls one aspect of the attack that could have been a big problem: “What follows is what I remember that one of the EW’s (electronic warfare technician) told me. How true it is I do not know. During the engagement, Biddle had the destroyer USS Gray (DE-1054) assigned as a shotgun for protection. As soon as the Biddle started shooting they (the Gray) lit off all their fire control radars trying to find whatever it was we were shooting at. With the Biddle being the biggest target out there, they kept locking on to us. One of the Biddle’s EW’s put the Shortstop system in full automatic mode, so that every time the Gray locked on to us, the system would go active and break the lock. How true, I do not know. “

What happened aboard Biddle’s shotgun, the USS Gray, when Biddle started throwing missiles, 3-inch, and 5-inch projectiles all over the sky? Gray crew member ETR2 Tom Bunce was there and recalls what happened:

Early on the night of the attack, the ET shop requested to take the SPS-40 long range air search radar down for maintenance. We had one of the best SPS-40 techs in the Western Pacific and because of his skills, we had almost non-stop Air Guard responsibilities. The 40 was in need of work if we were to continue the level of Air Guard that had been expected. The Captain requested that Biddle pick up the Air Guard and a few other duties while we went into a quick maintenance period, which included the ECM tuners in the room just below the stack.

I was on the phones just as the EW tech and I finished the SPS-40 maintenance. I heard that the Biddle had launched two missiles and both ships where to go to General Quarters. The Ops boss told us to stay put- it did not matter much for me since my GQ station was South ASW plot. The ET shop passed the word that the 40 was coming up, but it would be ten minutes before it was ready to transmit.

Two minutes later, the Gray leaned heavy to starboard in what was probably ten degrees of turn. CIC passed the word that Biddle decided we could not run, since the Gray had no aft defenses at all. I was told both ships were going to charge the oncoming MiGs, and we had a lock. The ship then heaved to the port in a ten-degree turn, and I was told that the Biddle felt the lock was possibly on them but could not confirm it, so we needed to break the lock. A lot of bad words then came across the phones saying the mount and director were not even pointed toward the Biddle. Lock was broken anyway, and the target never reacquired. The word was then passed that the Biddle had opened fire with her guns. Within five minutes, the action was over.

I went to CIC and learned that the carrier delay was due to a stand down order, and the carrier had done just that! No BARCAP and no ready deck is what caused a 20 minute delay in getting air support to the PIRAZ position.

Other Accounts

My research found several other accounts of Biddle’s battle and there are discrepancies between them and those presented here. It is interesting and educational to study a few tense moments from several viewpoints.

FTM2 Bill Galey

 FTM2 Bill Galey, who worked the O-4 level transmitter room and radar barbette 2, has contributed a radically different account.

I remember the GQ alarm going off around 2215 hours. The general response was, “Oh, hell, not another one!” There had been several GQs in the time we were on station, and the crew was getting jaded about them.

I heaved out, dressed, and made my way up, then port/aft/down to the radar control room. As I was dropping thru the hatch by Shortstop, I felt the ship shudder twice. I knew a missile salvo had been fired, and I thought, “Is this another Fast Eddie (Captain Carter) drill?” My opinion was buttressed when I got into radar control, and asked Tom Czelatka (FTM3) who was manning Console #1 what he saw. His answer was, “Clouds!” There was *no* target blip on the range display.

The second salvo – there were only two, confirmed in the ships log copy that I saw before it disappeared from the web – was even more problematic. I was watching when the second designation came down, and saw the same indications. Upon discussing the action afterwards, the FTM1 (can’t remember his name) in radar plot said that the range rates _were_ zero. Not that they “…went to zero”, but that there was never any target rate to begin with. This is a classic “tracking a cloud” scenario.

I will also state that the traditional “Bird in the Range Gate” call, indicating a radar echo from the missile as it closes on a target, was not made. We did not see missile returns on either salvo.

The only way I can see that we actually got a kill was that the 55Bs were in Low Elevation (Lo-E) mode, and enough CWI RF energy was being reflected for the Terrier to see it and home in. Lo-E was a mode that allowed the 55Bs to track in azimuth only with elevation fixed at 0 degrees, and was designed to counter the Komar and Osa cruise missile boats that the NV had.

Surface Warfare Interview

In an interview on 12 June 1978, Scot MacDonald, Surface Warfare magazine editor, talked with Rear Admiral Edward W Carter, Biddle’s commanding officer during the MiG attack. The interview, which was found in the archives of the Naval Historical Foundation at the Washington Navy Yard, was published in the January 1979 issue of Surface Warfare. In the interview Captain Carter stated: “We knew for some time prior to the night of the attack that the North Vietnamese were planning another attack against the fleet. They had bombed USS Higbee back in April, at the time of USS Sterett’s engagement with the MiGs. All of the various sources we had available to us – they were quite good, including our own observations of the North Vietnamese tactical exercises – certainly made it clear to us that they were preparing for another attack on the fleet. Of course, being on the PIRAZ station, we were the closest to the North Vietnamese mainland. We felt kind of vulnerable, so I had taken a number of measures to improve the readiness of the ship.”

Captain Carter stated in the interview that he believed “that whenever the attack came, it would come as a result of a decreased readiness in the Combat Air Patrol. And it happened that way.” Just before the attack, BARCAP readiness was diminished when one of the two BARCAPs on station in the northern Tonkin Gulf escorted a damaged A-6 Intruder back to Yankee Station, leaving a single BARCAP south of PIRAZ. This, it appears, is what the North Vietnamese were waiting for.

A solo A-6 Intruder on a night bombing mission over North Vietnam during bad weather sounds doubtful to me. Perhaps it was a very important, but easy target, and the Navy was confident that a single A-6 could do the job. Also, it is difficult to believe that on a night preceded the day before with 50 or more MiG flights over North Vietnam, that the Navy left a single, now vulnerable BARCAP, to protect the fleet. The fact that Lieutenant Muse knew that there were absolutely no friendly planes over North Vietnam and that a BARCAP had returned to Yankee Station was what allowed him (Muse) to launch two birds with complete confidence that the approaching targets were hostile MiGs.

Later in the interview, Captain Carter related a story about two “Big Mother” helicopter pilots from a Yankee Station carrier who, immediately after the first missile was fired, checked on their helo that was lashed to Biddle’s helo deck, located on the aft end of the ship just forward of the 5-inch gun. At this time, Biddle was making 27 knots on a heading that took her away from shore. After the two carrier pilots had completed their inspection and were walking forward on the port side near Mount 32, the second attack occurred. The 3-inch gun started firing, which drove the two pilots back toward the 5-inch gun, which started firing too. With nowhere to go, the pilots “spent the next few minutes under the port boat davits, trying to dig a hole into a steel deck. They were absolutely terrified.” Carter then described how the next morning the two pilots (now combat veterans if they weren’t before) rescued a downed airman in Haiphong harbor.

During the interview, Carter mentioned that four Terrier missiles were fired – two during the first attack, and two more missiles in the second attack. On the other hand, Lieutenant Muse remembers that six missiles were fired – two each at the first two targets in the first attack and two more on the second attack.

Carter also mentioned that the Navy knew, and it was clear to him from his personal observations as well, that the North Vietnamese were preparing an attack against the fleet. Lieutenant Muse does not remember that kind of information was made available to him as CIC/NTDS Officer, and there was not a general feeling that the North Vietnamese were about to attack the fleet.

Scot MacDonald also interviewed Commander Eugene Heckathorn, Biddle’s executive officer during the attack. One humorous incident on the bridge that Heckathorn recalled was, “I turned around and looked at the helmsman. He was standing there in his skivvies, with his helmet on….” The commander went on to say that the helmsman did not have a chance to put his trousers on until “after the action was over.” Also, Heckathorn recalled that right in the middle of all the action, Biddle’s sonarmen picked up a sonar contact. The contact turned out to be false, and Heckathorn believed the sonar anomaly was caused by a “hard knuckle” – the rudder making hard, rapid movements during maneuvers.

 

Biddle’s 1972 Command History

A now declassified document, USS Biddle Confidential Message, Subject: Command History – -Summary of Operations, states “Biddle was attacked on the night of 19 July by five MiG aircraft in two raids. Biddle destroyed one MiG from the first raid with Terrier missiles and possibly one from the second raid with five-inch and three-inch gunfire. The other MiGs were driven off, and Biddle received no damage.” There was no mention of North Vietnamese torpedo boats participating in the attack.

In addition to the MiG kill on 19 July, the message lists thirteen MiG kills attributed to Biddle’s intercept controllers during the period 12 April to 26 October. They are as follows: OS1 Kronvall – 4 MiG 19s; OSC Bump – 2 MiG 17s, 1 MiG 21; OS1 Nastasi – 4 MiG 21s; OS1 Anderson – 1 MiG 21, and OS2 Stump – 1 MiG 21. Furthermore, the message lists the following ammunition expended in combat during 1972: Missiles – 4 Standards (confirming Captain Carter’s account); ASROC – one; CHAFFROC – none; 3” projectiles – 28 rounds; 5” projectiles – 30 rounds.

MiG Attack Tonkin Gulf

MiG Attack Tonkin Gulf -July 19, 1972, by JO3 Tom Kelley, is a press account that was also found in the archives of the Naval Historical Foundation at the Washington Navy Yard. The USS Biddle website at http://ussbiddle.org/ reprinted Kelley’s account. JO3 Kelley is not listed in Biddle’s 1972 cruise book as a crewmember. The article repeats several of the discrepancies regarding the solitary A-6 over North Vietnam and the lonely BARCAP left to defend the fleet.

In his article, Kelly states that when the first group of MiGs was detected “feet dry” over North Vietnam, “the captain was summoned to CIC, and their presence was neither unusual or cause for exceptional alarm.” Later, when the MiGs went “feet wet” the captain “hustled to CIC”, determined that the MiGs were a threat, and ordered General Quarters sounded. The events as they unfolded according to Lieutenant Muse, were as follows: 1.) MiGs detected “feet wet” at low altitude and high speed, 2.) The threat was immediately evaluated by crew in CIC and the captain was summoned; 3.) “Clear the fo’c’sle” was passed on 1MC; 4.) Missiles fired; 5.) General Quarters announced; 6.) Captain Carter arrives CIC.

Holding the Line In The Tonkin Gulf

In the August 2000 Vietnam magazine article “Holding the Line In the Tonkin Gulf,” Don L. Hart, a young signalman aboard Biddle, recalled that after hearing general quarters:

I climbed out of my rack and pulled on some dungarees that I always kept under my mattress for such emergencies. Then I methodically began making my way up to the bridge. When I reached the mess decks, however, I broke into a run as did other crewmen headed for GQ stations. Over the ships intercom came a warning to stay clear of our Terrier launcher. We all knew what that meant: Missiles were about to be fired against the enemy.
I reached the bridge just in time to see a pair of Terrier missiles roar from our double launcher. As I ran back to the signal bridge on the outside of the ship, I saw a fireball form in the night sky, split in two and crash toward the dark ocean below. One of our missiles had hit a MiG.

Before the night was over, a total of five enemy aircraft in two separate waves attacked Biddle. The ship’s crew generally believed, although it was never officially confirmed, that we shot down one additional MiG that night either by missiles or by gunfire, which we used when we had trouble locking on to the enemy aircraft with our air search radar. [Authors note: I believe he meant to say “fire control radar” instead of “air search radar.”] The other MiGs broke off their attacks and returned to their bases. One, however, flew directly over Biddle before seeking safety.

Conclusions

Over time, memories weaken, stories become embellished, and facts become twisted. There are three undisputed facts – 1.) Five MiGs in two raids attacked Biddle on 19 July 1972. 2.) A Terrier missile in the first salvo destroyed a MiG in the first attack. 3.) One MiG pilot bravely flew directly over Biddle and either forgot to drop a bomb or could not.

There are numerous parts of the attack that are not resolved and probably never will be. Among them are the composition of the two raids, the exact sequence of events, the number of missiles fired, and possible damage to a second or third MiG, US activity in the air over North Vietnam at the time of the attack, and North Vietnamese gunboat activity.

Some Biddle crewmembers recall that North Vietnamese gunboats joined the attack, but were driven back after a pounding from Biddle’s 5-inch gun. Others heard that the surface targets were actually U.S. Navy torpedo boats looking for a piece of the action. Lieutenant Muse does not recall friendly PT boats in the area, any gunfire directed toward North Vietnamese MTBs, or any conversations in CIC related to gunboats. On Biddle’s first deployment to the Gulf, Captain Scott remembers that the coast of North Vietnam produced radar ghosts that resembled real targets. These false returns occurred near the area where in 1999 the destroyers Turner Joy and Maddox fired on phantom targets. It is unlikely that North Vietnamese gunboats attacked Biddle.

Lieutenant Muse, who was present in CIC during the entire attack, had a unique perspective of the events as they unfolded. Also, he was the officer selected to debrief investigators immediately after the attack. Accounts from other sailors in CIC and topside, with few exceptions, corroborate Lieutenant Muse’s account. Muse is certain that six missiles were fired in three salvos, which OS1 Kronvall’s account seems to support, while other crewmembers remember only four Terriers in two salvos. Lieutenant Muse’s account elevates the events from a mere “Sea Story” to an account that represents the most accurate description of the events that you will be able to find.

To be fair, I wrote the Vietnam ambassador to the United States asking for contacts at military agencies in Vietnam that could provide information about the attack. The letter was never answered. A thorough search of the Internet was fruitless as well.

The Biddle Deck Log

Information regarding “The Attack at PIRAZ” was requested from several government agencies using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). First, Biddle’s deck log for 19 July 1972 was requested from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The agency reported that they “examined the deck logs for USS Biddle and found that the logs for July 1972 were missing from the file. It is unclear whether those logs were ever received from the Navy when they transferred them to the National Archives. We have searched for these logs here, but have found nothing.” Biddle deck logs for June 1972 were found, however. A second FOIA request was made to the NARA for USS Sterett deck logs for 19 April 1972, the date of the “Battle Off Dong Hoi.” Those deck logs were found. Why would Sterett’s logs be preserved and Biddle’s not?
Another FOIA request was sent to the National Security Agency (NSA), which always had a security detachment aboard Biddle in the Gulf of Tonkin. The NSA reported “A thorough search of our files was conducted, but no records responsive to your request were located. An appeal was filed which produced identical results.

It is difficult for me to believe that a U.S. Navy combatant did not record in her logs the fact that five North Vietnamese MiGs attacked her, that she went to general quarters to defend herself and the fleet, and that she responded to the attack by firing four missiles and launching a barrage of gunfire. In an e-mail referencing the missing deck log entries, Lieutenant Muse reminded me, “Keep in mind that the ‘folks from Washington’ who visited us after the attack told us the ‘incident’ was to be kept secret and should not be discussed or written about. The first public disclosure was made when the ship returned to Norfolk. Would they have changed the deck log?”

Would they? And why? Lieutenant Muse remembers that there was a detachment of NSA “spooks” aboard during the attack and that the NSA debriefed him soon after the attack, even though the different agencies did not always identify themselves. We can assume with some certainty that deck log entries were made during the attack as a matter of procedure, yet the pages related to the attack later mysteriously disappeared. Did they disappear at the request of a government agency, from further up the military chain of command, or from within Biddle?