Clash With Kadaffi

[The National Archives and Records Administration was unable to locate Biddle’s Command Histories for 1980 and 1981. Reconstruction of Biddle’s activities during those years was provided by Hard Chargers who were aboard Biddle. Lieutenant Mike Sasser, Biddle’s CIC Officer, recalls some of the events from the early 80s.]

Mike Sasser

1980 – 1981

I believe we were in the shipyards all of 1980. I reported in March 1980 and the entire crew was living on those stupid barges. During the overhaul period, Biddle received upgrades to her weapons and electronics suites. The first production unit of the Vulcan Phalanx was installed, the Harpoon weapons system replaced the 3-inch guns and the famous SHORTSTOP electronic warfare suite was replaced by the “Slick 32” (SLQ-32 V3). We also added an 02 or 03 level between the macks. This was right above the wardroom where the 3-inch batteries used to be. We received the Classic Outboard equipment room which sat on top the Helo hanger. I believe Phalanx and Harpoon completed the visible upgrades. I also remember getting the new life boats. They were contained in a sealed fiberglass shell that was designed to open after sinking to a particular depth. I don’t remember what that depth was, but I thought “Only the Navy would think of making a lifeboat sink before being able to use it.”

Captain Hollis E. Robertson assumed command of Biddle in September of 1980. He enlisted in the Navy in 1951, entered the Naval Academy a year later and graduated from the Academy in 1956. He received a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and co-authored the Naval Engineer’s Guide published by the Naval Institute in 1972. He served at sea in Francis M. Robinson (DE-220), Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42), Catamount (LSD-17), Columbus (CG-12), Wainright (CG-28), and commanded Charles S. Perry (DD 697) and Rich (DD-820).
The overhaul was accomplished at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyards while our families remained in Norfolk. We worked long hard hours during the week so that those of us who did not have duty on the weekend could leave at noon on Friday and carpool the six hours back to Norfolk. For a while we even employed a beat up old school bus called the Blue Goose to ferry us back and forth, but the old bus succumbed to mechanical problems and quickly became economically unfeasible.

Gliding down the Delaware River during our shakedown cruise we were informed over the 1MC that 30% of the crew had never been to sea and 50% had not been to sea on Biddle. We were pretty green. I specifically remember OSCS Tomlinson trying to get his young CIC crew to report a contact to the bridge before we actually passed that contact’s closest point of approach. Two hours into the trip he finally did it. He couldn’t have been prouder if his wife had just presented him with a brand new son. After over a year of chipping and painting, it was clear that we all needed to be retrained for combat. Gitmo would provide just the services we needed.
There is an interesting story that goes along with the first shooting of the first production Phalanx. We were in the VACAPES after completing overhaul. The Navy didn’t have any assets to give us to drag an airborne target, so we had to use civilians. The difference between civilians and Navy pilots is only a matter of days. They gave these civilians a Lear jet and a towed target and sent him to us. We told him what we wanted – for the target to be evaluated as a threat we wanted to have it come at Biddle on a collision course at about 50 feet off the deck. First of all the pilot had no intention of flying that low. Second of all he did not want to have his plane anywhere near the ship when we energized the fully auto, closed loop aircraft killing machine. He let out all his cable, which amounted to approximately one mile of cable. He started at about 1000 feet and steadily descended until the target was only a little too high.
He commenced his first run by flying directly over the fan tail. We switched on “R2D2” but by the time the target got there, Phalanx evaluated it a non-threat. We were only doing about 5 knots at the time. It took several attempts before the pilot gained enough confidence to fly directly over the missile launcher. This time the Phalanx jumped, tracked and fired for about two seconds. It scored a direct hit on the turn buckle holding the target to the cable. The second target was sawn in half. It still gives me goose bumps to think that the CIWS is on our side.

With the aid of the training received in Gitmo and at Vieques Island we were an extremely capable and confident force. We were ready to prove ourselves on our next deployment to the Mediterranean. This was scheduled to be a short deployment for us – we would leave in early August 1981, demonstrate our refusal to recognize Muammar Khaddafi’s 200-mile territorial limits, tour the Black Sea, see a few ports and return to Norfolk in mid-October.

We were teamed with the Nimitz task force. Unfortunately we were not overly confident in the Nimitz. She was relatively easy to defeat in the war games we had with her in the Caribbean a few weeks earlier, and seemed to exhibit little pride in her seamanship. Scuttlebutt said that she had failed her ORI, but had to make the deployment anyway since there was no ship to replace her.
One of the ships in our task force had a mechanical failure that delayed our departure date for three days. Therefore the transit to the Med had to be made in six days instead of the usual nine. It wasn’t until the third day of the transit that it finally dawned on the Nimitz staff that we were passing through time zones at a faster rate than the original plans had called for. Therefore we had to adjust the clocks every night for the rest of the transit. In fact, I believe that we had to adjust it two hours one night.

Nimitz arrived in the Mediterranean Sea, embarked the 6th Fleet battle staff and proceeded to confirm our impressions of her by losing every mock battle she was in. For the next few days we transited with Nimitz to the Gulf of Sidra where she was joined by the USS Forrestal task force. The Forrestal group was on its way out of the Med and played a supporting role over the next few days. The Forrestal was equipped with the older F-4 Phantoms while the Nimitz carried the F-14 Tomcats from VF-41, the “Black Aces.”.

The Operations Officer, Lieutenant Commander Steve Pilnick, recognized the gravity of the situation and decided to brief the entire operations department on the potential ramifications of the upcoming operation. This briefing was so successful that Lieutenant Commander Pilnick was directed to brief a larger audience the next day. He began by comparing the United States government with the Soviet Union government. Even though our two nations were at odds and very antagonistic with each other, they were both very stable governments and each knew just how far he could push the other. Neither was going to do anything to jeopardize the delicate balance of power between them. He then said, “I said all that to say this. That is not the situation we have with Libya and its government. They have aircraft and pilots, very quiet submarines, and missile bearing patrol boats they don’t mind sacrificing for their unstable leader.” He simply reminded us to remain on our toes and do our jobs.

The missile exercise was scheduled for August 18th and 19th. The actual missile exercise required four ships. One ship launched the target drones and the other three ships would take turns shooting special missiles at the drone. These missiles were fitted with special telemetry packages in place of the warhead. The telemetry data would be captured by the firing ship and record data about the missile intercept. This would give detailed analysis of the performance of the entire Terrier missile system. The goal was not to hit the drone, but to determine if the drone would have been hit if an actual warshot version of the missile had been fired. That way the drone could be recovered and used again. Since we were one of the three missilex ships, we had two telemetry birds loaded and ready to fire at a moment’s notice.

August 18th was a very frustrating day. From dawn the Libyans began flying fighter aircraft toward our positions. It was clear that they were looking for a carrier but they never did find her. The Nimitz launched E-2C Hawkeyes as early warning aircraft and to control the F-14s being launched. The orders for the F-14 pilots were to intercept the Libyan aircraft and maintain a firing position on them. The F-14s were not allowed to shoot unless they were fired upon. The Libyan fighter pilots had no intention of letting the F-14s remain in a firing position on them, so there was a lot of high G, air combat maneuvering going on amongst all the pilots. Add to this the inability of the Libyans to find their primary target, and it is easy to see how fuses can become very short. The day was also frustrating for the missilex ships. The Libyans were continually fouling the missile range thereby preventing the shooting of any missiles. The only good news is that we were inside the Gulf of Sidra and demonstrating freedom of the seas. As night fell, the Libyan sorties quit and the missilex was suspended until daylight. However we all continued to read the latest intelligence reports in order to keep track of the other Libyan threats. Everything remained calm until daylight.

August 19th began pretty much as the day before. Just after daybreak, more Libyans were in the air along with the Hawkeyes and F-14s. The aircraft launched by Nimitz were all perfect. I remember one lost a backup radio just after leaving the cat and he was ordered to turn back. One of the F-14s was able to pick up radar contacts from its own radar at four times the expected range. The Nimitz made sure they had nothing but the best in the air.

As the CIC Officer I walked into Combat shortly after 0700. The OPS Officer had already assumed the duties as the Tactical Action Officer (TAO). I occupied the NTDS console as the Ships Weapons Coordinator (SWC). We were watching the screens and listening to the background noise chatter when we heard those chilling words for the first time. “Two fitters has (sic) fired at my leader.” Then four seconds later came, “…this is 102, we’ve been fired on.” The next several seconds were a blur. The TAO called the Captain then leaned over to me and said, “Well, I guess we should go to GQ.” It is amazing what happens to your attitude when you’ve been briefed on the threat, lived through one tense day, and then hear the general quarters alarm go off without the “This is a drill” preamble. Immediately the telemetry missiles were struck below and warshots were in place and ready on the rails. We were on our toes and alert for all threats.

The entire transcript follows:

00:03, 102: Going to [garbled] right now, I’ll stay in [garbled] scan.
00:07, Bare Ace (Air Intercept Controller): And 102 [garbled] 226 36
00:15, 102: Twenty miles for 102. Twenty thousand feet.
00:19, Bare Ace: 225 at 33 102.
00:24, Bare Ace: And what’s your [garbled something about the contact]?
00:27, 102: 102’s got one 214 16 miles out, that’s all I’ve got.
00:31, 102: He appears to be turning a little bit left giving us a left aspect. I’m in single target track.
00:38, 102: 14 miles 21,000.
00:44, Bare Ace: 113 say your heading.
00:48, 113: 113’s heading 070
00:54, 102: 10 miles. The bogeys got us on his nose now 8 miles.
01:03, 102: We’re at altitude, twenty thousand feet 6 miles.
01:06, Bare Ace: 103, 113 your vector 100.
01:25, Bare Ace: 103 state.
01:31, 107: Two fitters has shot at my leader.
01:35, 102: [garbled]… this is 102, we’ve been fire on.
01:46, Bare Ace: And 102.
01:50, Bare Ace: OK copy.
01:51, unknown: Did you copy that Bare Ace?
01:52, Bare Ace: Negative, what did one of them say?
01:54, 102: 107
02:03, unknown: Bare Ace, did you just copy 103?
02:05, Bare Ace: That’s negative.
02:05, unknown: Because they said they’ve just been fired upon, that’s what they transmitted.
02:15, Bare Ace: 103 confirm you’ve been shot at, over.
02:18, unknown: relay [garbled]confirm you’ve been shot at.
02:21, 102: amongst interference Affirmative.[garbled] shot one of them down.
02:26, unknown relay, Did you shoot one of them down?
02:29, 102: It was a clean target.
02:34, 107: [garbled]Want me shoot my guy down?
02:35, 102: That’s affirm, shoot him… shoot him down.
02:45, Bare Ace: 205, 223 vector inbound at this time.
02:49, 223: 223 inbound
02:53, 107: Fox 2 kill from music. Fox 2 kill.
02:56, 102: [name] did you get him?
02:58, 107: Yes sir, I did kill him.[garbled several seconds]
03:05, 107: Fox 2 kill. His chute is not deploying. He is falling free.
03:08, 102: OK, roger that.
03:11, Bare  Ace: 106 Reset CAP 5. 106, 110 reset cap 5.
03:14, 107: [garbled]123 DME on the 180. And my state ten two, ten two.
03:27, 102: OK I’m nine five.
03:29, Nimitz: 102 107, you are clear to defend yourself.
03:31, Bare Ace: 102 107, you are clear to defend yourself. Pass from the ship.
03:35, 102: And this is 102 107, ah two enemy kills.
03:40, Bare Ace: Say again.
03:41, 102: Two enemy kills. Two MIG-23s killed.
03:45, unknown relay: Two MIG-23s. You copy Bare Ace?
03:48, Bare Ace: Roger.[garbled]
03:52, 107: Mine was a Fitter, a Fitter.
03:59, Bare Ace: 102 107 You copy? That’s vector north.
04:41, Bare Ace: 107, Bare Ace.
04:44,102: This is 102 go ahead.
04:47, Bare Ace: Were one or two hit?
04:55, 102: 102 and 107 are fine. We’re both headed north. And there are two…
04:58, Bare Ace: Roger that. And confirm you’ve got two MIG-23 kills.
05:03, 102: OK one was a Fitter and they’re probably both Fitters. And there are two kills.
05:07, unknown relay: Bare Ace you copy? There are two kills. Either Fitters or Floggers.

The entire engagement from the Libyans pulling the trigger until pulling their rip cord took less than one and one-half minutes. Another one and one-half minutes later the Nimitz (presumably the sixth fleet battle staff) radioed that the two F-14 pilots were “Clear to defend yourself.” The Libyans never had a chance. They took a bad shot by shooting head on with a heat seeking missile, they had much inferior aircraft, and they just happened to pick on the VF-41 Squadron Commander. The pilots I felt the most sorry for were the F-14 pilots ordered to cover the next Libyan flight coming out. They did not have permission to fire unless they were fired upon. As it happens, no more shots were fired. This remarkable incident was the first Navy air combat confrontation since the Vietnam War and the first for the F-14A Tomcat and Biddle was there! Again we went to bed with visions of intelligence reports dancing in our heads.

Next on the agenda was a trip to the Black Sea. We entered the Black Sea late in August 1981 after a port call in Istanbul. While in Istanbul we had invited an important leader in the Turkish government to visit the ship and have lunch with us. Shortly before he arrived someone realized that we were about to feed a Moslem man a meal with ham. The menu was quickly switched to spaghetti. Here is a hint. If you want to impress sailors wearing dress whites and about to go through the inspection of their lives, do NOT feed them spaghetti. I was assigned to the quarterdeck watch, so I just skipped lunch all together. Choker whites and spaghetti do not mix.
Repairing your ship is a way of life in the Navy. The Biddle was no different. In early October 1981 we pulled into Sardinia where we were able to moor next to a tender. We had several repairs to be attended to and used that time for a liberty call as well. It turned out to be a nice enough place though not very exciting until October 6th. That was the day Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. We were immediately and indefinitely extended in the Med. Every ship was ordered to get underway. This was especially hard for us since some vital pieces of equipment lay in pieces in the bowels of the tender beside us. We had to wait two to three days to be back into operation. If memory serves me correctly, we fouled the anchor while we were hauling it in. We could not clear it, and since every ship in the Med was off the coast of Egypt (save one), we had no choice but to sever the chain and go…and go we did.

As hard and uncertain as the run-in with Khaddafi was, this was as bad or even worse. We already had our ticket punched and were anxious to go home, but now here we were headed the wrong direction with no relief in sight. Not only that but if the region ignited into war, who knows when we would see home again? At least in Libya, we held our destiny in our own hands. That was no longer the case. We had to sit still and allow the politicians to work their little games. History tells us that little, if anything important erupted at that time. The extension turned out to be a little over one month. We all made it home and life went on for everyone but President Sadat.